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WSNs are trending towards dynamic environments that enable multiple parties to concur-
rently deploy and exploit multiple applications on shared nodes. The node owners want to
share their nodes’ capabilities in order to increase return on investment, provide value
added services, and easily share sensor node services. These concepts drive an evolving
view on the software support that is required to service all stakeholders. For example, trust
establishment, access control and security policy enforcement must be addressed. The
node middleware must be extended to enable such shared usage of nodes while ensuring
security. This paper presents the SecLooCI WSN middleware, which enables secure multi-
party interactions on top of resource constrained sensor nodes. A prototype implementa-
tion for AVR Ravens running the Contiki OS shows the feasibility of the model for this
low power micro-controller class of devices. This demonstrates that resource constrained
sensor nodes are able to support secure node sharing.
 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have many uses in a
variety of fields such as industry [1], agriculture [2], logis-
tics [3] and domotics [4]. These settings provide us with
many and often dissimilar requirements. However, this
paper identifies three similarities: WSNs are multi-party,
multi-application and dynamic environments [5].
Firstly, WSN ecosystems are multi-party [6,7]. In all
mentioned use cases, the ecosystem comprises multiple
parties or administrative domains that at the very least
want to share sensor data. Many WSNs provide data for
interested third parties, be it for habitat monitoring [8],
river monitoring [9], or supply chain monitoring [3]. In
most current cases, users can only access a data repositorymade available by the WSN owner. In future use cases,
users have direct access to the sensor data to ensure integ-
rity and freshness, and deploy custom code to enable node
local data processing and formatting. These users then
reimburse the WSN owner, increasing the owner’s return
on investment.
Secondly, WSNs are multi-application [10–12]. A real
world sensor network is seldom single purpose. A sensor
network consists of many nodes, some of which might
have a single function. The entirety of the network how-
ever hosts multiple applications, sharing node and net-
work resources. For example, a building sensor network
executes a HVAC application, a person tracking application,
and a fire detection application.
Lastly WSNs are dynamic in both physical and logical
composition [13]. The physical composition of sensor net-
works changes due to node mobility and node failure: new
nodes enter the network, and old nodes disappear because
they stop functioning or move out of network range. The
network’s logical composition, meaning the applications
142 J. Maerien et al. / Ad Hoc Networks 25 (2015) 141–169executing, is also dynamic: new applications are added,
old applications updated, and redundant applications
removed, as illustrated by multiple papers on application
management in WSNs [14–16]. This node evolution is
often divergent: nodes have different and evolving config-
urations and code installed to meet changing context and
requirements [17].
Node sharing is a crucial enabler of such multi-party,
multi-application, and dynamic use cases. As argued above,
sharing sensor nodes allows increased node utility with
relatively little additional cost or overhead. Some systems
exist that allow insecure node and service sharing [18–
20]. Once one party has physically installed a node, other
parties can use the sensing and actuation services of this
node. Platform Owners enable sharing because this allows
them to offer value added (and paid) services. Node users
on the other hand want to use shared nodes since this
allows usage of the WSN’s capabilities without having to
deploy nodes, significantly reducing cost and start-up
delays.
Node sharing significantly affects the security require-
ments of sensor systems. To ensure node availability and
integrity, node owners require that all data flows involving
their nodes are secure. Since many of these data flows
involve multiple parties, they must be updated to allow
multiple parties to securely communicate with the sensor
node with varying degrees of access. To maintain security
in this multi-user environment, this paper identifies five
data flows which require revision: (1) network initialisa-
tion, (2) application deployment, (3) application manage-
ment, (4) application service usage, and (5) application
communication.
While currentWSN security middleware solutions, such
as Zigbee [21], LEAP [22], and TinySec [23], provide secure
application communication, the currently proposed solu-
tions have significant shortcomings with regards to
enabling shared usage of WSNs. These solutions are tar-
geted at the classic single owner, single application, static
network paradigm and often only look at specific features
rather than a comprehensive solution. The multi-party par-
adigm requires that ad hoc networks can be formed con-
sisting of nodes, owned by multiple different parties, and
that multiple parties can securely deploy, manage and
monitor sensor applications on these shared sensor nodes.
Some of our previous work proposes point solutions for
certain sub-problems, for example secure network creation
[24], secure application deployment [25], secure applica-
tion management [26], and network monitoring [27]. This
paper adds to this work by analysing the application lifecy-
cle, identifying all security requirements with regards to
sharing to create a comprehensive security middleware,
mapping these security requirements to both existing
work and novel work and integrating all systems into the
comprehensive SecLooCI secure middleware architecture.
A proof of concept shows the feasibility of this comprehen-
sive architecture.
The contribution of this paper is a comprehensive sen-
sor middleware solution that enables secure multi-party
sharing of resource-constrained WSN devices: SecLooCI.
An extensive problem motivation and requirement analy-
sis shows the necessity of a security middleware for sensornodes. The middleware architecture proposes an imple-
mentation independent solution for multi-party node
usage. An implementation is created on AVR Ravens
running the Contiki OS and LooCI component based mid-
dleware. The evaluation shows the feasibility of the archi-
tecture for even resource constrained wireless sensor
nodes.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 presents the context using a logistics use case
and identifies the different roles in the system. Section 3
identifies the five security requirements, proposes the
attacker model and lists additional requirements. Section 4
analyses currently available technology. Section 5 presents
the SecLooCI middleware architecture. Section 6 describes
the prototype, which is evaluated in Section 7. Finally, Sec-
tion 8 formulates the main conclusions.2. Context
This section presents the problem context. A logistics
use case shows the necessity of multiple parties to share
wireless sensor network infrastructure. The role model
defines these different roles in the system and identifies
their drivers and concerns. The lifecycle section identifies
the necessary interactions between and requirements of
the different roles to ensure a secure shared wireless sen-
sor network.2.1. Use case
Representative scenarios, for instance in logistics, show
the importance of dynamic multi-party environments
[6,3]. Multiple parties own part of the network and share
their resources with each other and other third parties.
These third parties reuse existing sensor deployments, sig-
nificantly reducing the effort required by these end users.
The Platform Owners recover some of the cost of installing
a sensor network by charging these third-party users.
For example, logistics providers install a fairly heavy
weight sensor in their containers with performance similar
to a smart phone to perform supply chain monitoring, with
smaller sensors and actuators across the container. These
sensors allow visibility of container status for all parties
in the supply chain, assuming the logistics providers shares
the sensor node data.
Many parties want to interact with the sensors of the
containers: (1) the owners of the goods want to know
the containers location and to ensure the goods are trans-
ported in a correct manner (limited shocks, no extreme
temperatures, etc.), (2) harbour owners and customs
require node access to enable localisation, monitor con-
tainer access and ensure correct handling of goods, and
(3) governments require access, temperature and location
data for security reasons: in order for easy customs pro-
cessing, it is necessary to prove container integrity and
ensure supply chain visibility, as for example required by
the US C-TPAT treaty (Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terror) [28] or the European Authorised Economic Opera-
tor certificate [29]. All these parties prefer live data to
ensure freshness, integrity and the ability to immediately
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assimilated in the sensor network to ensure the required
freshness and integrity of data, requiring deployment
of custom configurations and multi-party direct node
access.
2.2. Role model
This logistics use case, and other similar use cases, show
a drive toward network and node sharing. This section
describes the different roles in a multi-party WSNs which
result from separating ownership of platform, network,
and application as shown in Fig. 1.
The Application Owner (AO) wants to use the WSNs to
perform actuation or gather sensor data. He has certain
functional requirements, such as receiving temperature
data of nodes in a certain location, and non-functional
requirements, such as the level of security and quality of
service required of the communication channels. In the
classical case, the AO would have to purchase sensor
nodes, develop or buy an application, deploy a sensor net-
work and provide networking capabilities in order to be
able to deploy his application. This is a costly endeavour
and the sensor data provided by those sensors might not
be ideal due to the inability to install nodes on all locations
and on new mobile entities.
By reusing existing sensor nodes, these parties can sig-
nificantly reduce cost and effort of realising desired func-
tionality. An AO can use such a shared sensor network by
deploying a custom distributed application to enact the
desired functionality. The applications require certain
resources from the sensor node, such as sensing and stor-
age capabilities. The AO can reimburse the PO for using
those shared resources.
The Platform Owner (PO) is the owner of the sensor
node platforms. In the classical case the PO would deploy
his nodes, and provide network and applications himself.
Many nodes often would not have access to networking
provisions, especially in mobile scenario’s where ad
hoc networks are necessary to send messages. Deploying
such a system is often not sound from a cost-benefit
perspective.Discover
nodes
Provide access
Provides 
Owns
Plaorm
(Sensor node)
Provides 
Network
Uses
Applicaon
Owner (AO)
Network
Owner (NO)
Plaorm
Owner (PO)
Fig. 1. Overview of the three different roles in the WSN ecosystem.By sharing his nodes, he can get a faster Return on
Investment since other parties will pay to use the node’s
services. This reduces the PO’s investment risk of deploying
a WSN. Additionally, by sharing node capabilities with
other partners they can create more accurate or federated
services, such as localisation, theft detection and environ-
mental monitoring. Another aspect is that other parties
may provide network connection in return for access to
sensor node services. Clearly it is advantageous for the
PO to share his nodes’ resources.
However, the PO’s primary concern is the continued and
secure operation of his nodes. To ensure this continuity, he
requires that other parties can only access limited func-
tionality on his nodes, and that he can impose additional
restrictions on the usage of these services. For example
he wants that other parties can only configure their own
data subscriptions, and edit their own preferences on the
node.
The Network Owner (NO) manages the wireless net-
work. He provides network and Internet capabilities to
the local nodes. The NO sets up shared networks as a ser-
vice to users of his physical location, similarly to many
organisations that offer WiFi networking to visitors. For
example the harbour owner offers Internet to customers
using the harbour’s facility as a service. Additionally the
NO offers a node repository service, allowing AOs to query
which nodes are currently present in the network, and
which services they offer.
Combining roles Each party can perform one or more
of these roles depending on the situation. For example in
the harbour context: the PO of the container nodes is likely
also an AO since he will have an application monitoring the
current state of the containers. The harbour authorities
likely fulfil all three roles simultaneously: they provide
networking to all containers currently in the WSN (NO),
they have some static node infrastructure to allow for
example localisation services (PO), and they have a moni-
toring application running on both their own nodes and
foreign nodes to track all containers currently present in
the harbour (AO).
2.3. Application lifecycle
This section provides an overview of a sensor network
application lifecycle to enable shared wireless sensor net-
works, as shows in Fig. 2. This overview identifies the addi-
tional requirements by the different roles with regards to
securely setting up and using a shared wireless sensor net-
work. The application lifecycle lists the different stages an
application and network go through from creation to
removal of application, following a create, enact, run,
remove lifecycle. The lifecycle starts with the declaration
of policies and the creation of the sensor network applica-
tion. Next, the application is enacted and executed. Finally,
the lifecycle ends with the removal of the application. Sec-
tion 5.2 illustrates the lifecycle on the logistics use case
proposed in Section 2.
The first phase, the create phase, is divided in smaller
sub-phases based on role interactions and time of occur-
rence: (1) creation of security policies: (all roles individu-
ally); (2) creation of the application: (AO only); (3) setup
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Application
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Fig. 2. Overview of the lifecycle of a distributed multi-party sensor network application. At each phase, the role(s) relevant to that phase are mentioned.
Interaction is required in multiple phases to ensure safe cooperation.
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tion instantiation: (AO only). Sub-phase 1 and 2 are inde-
pendent of each other and can happen in any order, 3
must happen after 1, and 4 must happen after all others,
as shown in Fig. 2.
The first step of the multi-party lifecycle is the policy
declaration, which is done by all roles: PO, NO, and AO.
The POs declare which parties are trusted to use which
resources: POs need to be able to specify who can deploy
applications, use network and other services, to which
extend and at which cost. The POs also specifies the mini-
mal security level for data produced by their sensor nodes.
NOs need to specify which parties they allow use of their
network infrastructure. AOs need to specify which parties
or nodes they trust for application deployments.
Next comes the application creation phase. To enable
easy application reuse, the AO requires that an application
is specified separately from the actual deployment, and
offers some point of configuration to tune the application
to the exact deployment conditions. This paper assumes
that applications are declared using the Service Compo-
nent Architecture [30] standard. This standard states that
an application is a collection of parameterizable compo-
nents. Components offer services to other components,
and can use services provided by other components, the
operating system and the execution environment on which
they run. Current research has shown that sensor networks
can be efficiently programmed using components
[18,19,14]. The life cycle however is independent of the
exact application composition model used: while the
implementation might differ, the life cycle will remain
the same.
Next is the network setup. POs require NOs to create a
network, providing the necessary gateway nodes connect-
ing the WSN with the Internet. Once the initial network is
established, new nodes from trusted POs can join the net-
work and use the networking capabilities to communicate
with server infrastructure. The PO and NO might require
to negotiate cost and quality of service. At the end of the
phase, the node can communicate securely with other
nodes in the network, as well as users on the Internet. This
stage assumes that nodes of different POs can communicatewith each other and with the infrastructure of the NO.
While currently there is still significant research in
the MAC, routing and networking protocols to be used in
WSNs, it is necessary for standards to emerge to ensure
interoperability.
The final step in the application creation process is the
application instantiation. In this phase, the AO sets
the deployment parameters of the application, for example
on which node(s) the application must be deployed, the
coverage requirements and the sampling rate. During this
phase the AO also specifies security policies for different
data flows. For example the AO wants temperature read-
ings to have integrity codes, node location data to be
authenticated, and user presence information to be
encrypted. To instantiate the application, the AO needs
network information, such as node location, and PO infor-
mation such as the nodes and services he is allowed to use.
The AO must instantiate the application in such a way such
that all PO and AO policies are met.
Once the AO has instantiated the application,
application enactment can proceed. The AO enacts the
instantiated application by deploying the necessary code
or configurations in the sensor network. Due to the heter-
ogeneity of hardware, network and environment, only a
limited amount of nodes will receive very specific compo-
nents [17,18]. This differs from much related work which
assumes uniform network changes. Both the PO and AO
require that this deployment and configuration happens
secure. The AO can potentially delegate all tasks to the
PO, but we propose to let the AOs perform their own
deployment and management. This reduces the load for
POs, and AOs will likely want to perform additional man-
agement operations during the application lifetime. Addi-
tionally by allowing AOs to deploy on their own, the PO
does not have to be available at the time of deployment,
allowing offline deployment. Naturally the PO must be
assured that an AO can only deploy a limited set of appli-
cations, and only manage his own applications.
Once deployed, the application runtime phase starts.
During this phase, applications execute and communicate
using messages, and use system services. The AO may
require his application traffic to be secured if so specified
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that the application components only use the number of
specified services, and only for a set amount to prevent
overuse. Additionally, the AO may need to change the
application during this phase. For many use cases, the AO
only learns the exact environment by sensing it, and subse-
quently wants to adapt his application based on such sens-
ing, or as the environment changes, for example due to
nodes leaving and new trusted nodes arriving. Naturally
the AO and POs require that this adaptation happens
securely. During the runtime phase, the PO needs to mon-
itor the node system to ensure that all applications and
services operate as expected. This requires a flexible infra-
structure monitoring problems, such as network attacks,
platform error or application service overuse.
Once the application has performed the necessary sens-
ing and/or computing tasks, the application removal is
done by AO. To remove applications, an AO must be able
securely manage the application. The PO should also be
able to remove application components and configura-
tions, for example when the PO detects that a application
component uses too many system resources.
The final phase is application chargeback. Using the
data gathered from the application monitoring and other
runtime data, the PO can calculate a cost of running the
applications, and charge the AO for his applications on
the shared nodes.3. Requirements
The context has showna clear need for sharing of embed-
ded sensor nodes. To enable this scenario, the security pro-
visions of wireless sensor nodes and networks need to be
updated. This section identifies the data flows impacted
by sharing, presents the attacker model and lists the non-
functional requirements of the security middleware.
3.1. Feature requirements
This paper identifies 5 data flows which involve signif-
icant interaction between the different roles and the node
during the lifecycle as presented in Section 2.3. The data
flow approach is recommended by a.o. the SANS institute
[31]. This paper focuses only on the five data flows which
are significantly affected by node sharing.
3.1.1. Network initialisation
The first data flow is network initialisation. During the
network initialisation, the node has to register with the
Network Owner (NO). During the initialisation the PO of
the node joining the network requires that the NO is
known to be trustworthy. The NO on the other hand also
requires that the PO and the node are trustworthy before
allowing the node to join the network. This trust must
somehow be established, and deployed onto the node. This
trust exchange is crucial to establish a shared network.
Once trust is established, and key material is
exchanged, the new node potentially needs to be config-
ured with additional network configuration and enable
routing. However, we consider routing and networkconfiguration out of scope of this paper, since this is not
significantly impacted by sharing once key material and
trust has been set up. There is a large body of work that
attempts to solve these issues, which can be transferred
to the current system.3.1.2. Application deployment
Once the node has joined the network, and network
configuration has been established, the node needs to be
updated with custom code during the application enact-
ment phase. The PO requires that the new code is deployed
by a trusted party, and that the code is approved. A PO
likely wants to first review all code, before it is deployed
onto the node, to ensure the code does nothing malicious.
The PO must then be ensured that this code is deployed
unaltered. Additionally the PO can have additional security
policies associated with the code that also need to be
deployed. The AO also requires that his code is deployed
without alterations, so that no other parties can abuse
his code. Potentially the AO requires that his code is
deployed confidentially.3.1.3. Application management
After code has been deployed on the node, the
application runtime starts, and the AO must manage the
application. To manage his applications, the AO sends
management commands to the node to either reconfigure
or introspect. The AO requires that only users that he trusts
can manage his applications. The PO requires that AO’s can
only manage their own applications and configuration,
while not threatening the integrity of the platform, nor
the configurations of other AOs.3.1.4. Application service usage
During the runtime phase, the application uses services
provided by the node, such as communication service, and
sensing services to gather information, enact change or
communicate. The PO requires that this service usage is
monitored and restricted. This ensures that an application
component can only use a limited amount of node services.
For example an AO should only be able to send a limited
amount of messages, as to reduce the communication
overhead of the component.3.1.5. Application communication
Once the application has gathered data, it needs to com-
municate this data remotely. Both the PO and AO require
that they can express security policies which regulate
which information must be encrypted or authenticated.
These policies must then be negotiated and deployed on
the nodes, to ensure the most strict security policy is
enforced. For example an AO wants to deploy a localisation
application onto a node, and requires that the localisation
data is transmitted with message authentication. The PO
however requires that all localisation data is transmitted
confidentially. These policies must be resolved, the most
restrictive one selected(confidentiality), and then deployed
on the node and enforced on all future communication.
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The middleware must be able to handle attacks from
multiple different angles. This paper differentiates three
types of attackers: network attackers, physical attackers
and insider attackers. This section lists the resources avail-
able to these attackers, the goals they try to achieve, and
what the middleware must be able to prevent them from
doing.
Network attackers only have access to the messages
exchanged over the network, in accordance with the
Dolev–Yao [32] model. A network attacker can intercept,
manipulate, duplicate or create messages, but he cannot
break the underlying cryptographic primitives. He aims
to gain information on, or some kind of control over the
network. This includes: gaining the key material of one
or more nodes, gaining information on the applications
that are currently installed, or the data contained and pro-
duced by the sensor nodes. Alternatively he may attempt
to corrupt the sensor nodes and applications by performing
network level attacks such as denial of service attacks. The
node security middleware must prevent network attackers
from being able to manipulate the sensor nodes in any way
possible and to gain any information that is considered
confidential. While a sensor node cannot prevent a net-
work attacker to deny correct reception, he should not be
able to do anything else.
Physical attacker are attackers who gain access to all
information contained in one or more nodes through phys-
ical means. Standard sensor nodes are currently considered
incapable of resisting an attacker who can physically probe
the memory, unless the sensor node is physically secured,
by either being encapsulated in tamper proof hardware, or
in a physically secure environment. He aims to gain control
over or disable the network using the credentials gained
from one or more hacked sensor nodes. While it is impos-
sible for software to prevent hardware tampering, captur-
ing one node should not allow the physical attacker control
over other nodes. The node middleware must minimise the
effects of node capture. Networks must be able to recover
from the capture of any node once detected. The middle-
ware must also prevent a physical attacker from being able
to manipulate nodes other than the one he has probed.
Insider attackers are attackers that have credentials to
access some limited functionality of the system. They use
these credentials to attempt to gain more privileges. These
attacker have the same limitations as networked attackers,
but additionally possess valid credentials to access partial
functionality of the system. Their goal is to gain additional
information contained in the system or additional control
over the system. The node middleware must ensure that
the system and information remains confidential and
integer, and must ensure that potential breaches are
registered.
3.3. Non functional requirements
As discussed in the previous subsections, the secure
WSN middleware needs to be able to handle a variety of
different usage patterns and be able to adapt to many
potential situation. This section gives a general overviewof the non-functional requirements of the security
middleware:
3.3.1. Evolvability
The middleware must be able to support sensor net-
work evolution, be it evolving node compositions, applica-
tion compositions, application requirements or trust
relationships.
3.3.2. Performance
The middleware targets low resource environments and
thus requires resource consumption to be as low as possi-
ble. This includes communication overhead, memory over-
head (ROM and RAM), and processing overhead.
3.3.3. Transparency
Applications and application developers should be
oblivious to the fact that security is present on the
platforms. The security middleware must transparently
provide the necessary security features to allow all
applications to be secured. Such model is dictated by clean
software development to ensure separation of concerns:
application developers are seldom security experts, and
thus are often incapable of creating and maintaining bug-
free secure communication protocols [33]. The middleware
must allow AOs to specify security concerns in a policy dri-
ven fashion to allow easy declarative description of
required security provisions, for example in a policy lan-
guage such as the XML based XACML [34].
3.3.4. Compatibility
WSNs have multiple possible usage patterns. For
example some WSNs have a continuous connection to
the Internet, while others have a sporadic or very delayed
connection to the Internet. Furthermore WSNs use many
different communication patterns such as one-to-one,
many-to-one, or opportunistic communication [35]. The
security middleware must be compatible with these usage
patterns.
3.3.5. Flexibility
Due to the heterogeneous and resource limited nature
of WSNs and multiple different usage patterns, security
should be flexible. The security middleware must be able
to support multiple levels of security and different crypto-
graphic algorithms.
3.3.6. Shareability
The middleware must support sensor network usage by
multiple concurrent users with divergent access rights.4. Related work
The state-of-the-art has proposed many interesting
solutions which potentially address the node security
requirements that were presented in Section 3.1. This
section presents an overview of the most relevant related
work, and identifies that most related work focuses on
only one of the required features for a secure node
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support for node sharing.4.1. Network initialisation
Much research has been performed regarding network
key distribution and encryption protocols in WSNs
[36,37] to secure network communication. The existing
research can generally be subdivided in either pure sym-
metric key approaches, or asymmetric key integration.
Some examples of pure symmetric key approaches are:
(1) key distribution using group and pairwise keys [38],
(2) key pre-distribution schemes [39], (3) time-based key
distribution [40], and (4) time based key disclosure [41].
The application of asymmetric key encryption usually
involves optimising RSA for usage in WSN either by opti-
mising hardware [42] or software [43], or looking at novel
and efficient algorithms such as Elliptic Curve Cryptogra-
phy [44].
Key WSN examples are Zigbee, LEAP, and TinySec. Zig-
bee [21] offers a distinction between master, network
and link keys yet often fail to offer multi-user interaction
or easy network evolution. At network setup, the node is
authorised by the Trust Center (TC) by using the master
key. Once authorised, the TC can securely deploy network
and link keys. Similarly LEAP [22] distinguishes five differ-
ent types of keys: (1) basestation keys, (2) pairwise node
keys, (3) cluster keys, (4) group keys, and (5) master keys.
At deployment each node is equipped with the network
master key. This key is then used to set up the other keys.
Once the setup time is passed, all nodes delete the master
key, only leaving the other keys. TinySec [23] offers a flex-
ible link layer security that offers two modes of security:
authenticated encryption and authentication only. It can
be used with any key management protocol, and is inde-
pendent of the actual protocol used. Also it is not possible
to setup multiple communication channels with different
configurations in TinySec, creating a protocol that is either
always on or always off. While offering secure communica-
tion, none of these protocols offer multi-party integration,
easy network evolution, or manageable network security.4.2. Application deployment
With regards to secure deployment, many protocols
have been proposed in the related work, yet most assume
single owners nor include deployment of policy metadata.
Most algorithms attempt to secure Deluge [16], the TinyOS
[45] code dissemination protocol and propose a series of
hash chains or hash trees where the start of the chain/tree
is signed by the base-stations private key to provide integ-
rity and authenticity, for example Sluice [46] and Seluge
[47]. This can either be done using symmetric key encryp-
tion or public key encryption. Some propose to encrypt the
binary to provide confidentiality [48]. While these
approaches offer secure and efficient deployment of code,
they neglect the multi-user aspect of code distribution
and often have strong assumptions of single user sensor
nodes. Neither do they consider the need to deploy
resource usage limits for the deployed components.4.3. Application management
Many protocols offering a secure network layer with
authenticated message transmission on a node to node
basis, and can thus be considered to also tackle authenti-
cated management communication. Some examples are
LEAP [22], which has pairwise shared keys between nodes,
allowing unique identification, and TinySec [23], allowing
message authentication by using MACs. There are however
some additional protocols aimed specifically at authenti-
cating users at certain sensor nodes.
Similarly to secure network communication, there are
symmetric key and asymmetric key approaches. An exam-
ple of a symmetric key approach is sAQF [49]. sAQF
assumes a single network user which has the gateway
key chain. To authenticate a message, the user calculates
a 1 bit MAC with each key, and concatenates all these
MACs as message MAC. Each node has a subset of the user’s
keys, and can verify the bits for which he has the key. This
prevents a single node capture to allow physical attackers
to send authenticated messages to other nodes. The second
category are asymmetric key approaches, which authenti-
cate management messages using certificates. Several pro-
tocols have been proposed, that optimise this approach for
WSN usage, such as for example using bloom filters for ver-
ification [50], single network CA’s [51], or ring signature
authentication [52]. While the asymmetric key schemes
offer multi-user authentication, they are often too heavy-
weight for efficient use in resource restrained WSNs. Most
schemes also neglect to offer a clear management infra-
structure allowing evolution of access rights, or neglect
authorisation altogether.
4.4. Application service usage
Related work in application service usage monitoring
and enforcement can be divided in two approaches, active
node monitoring, and passive node monitoring. Current
proposed solution however have significant drawbacks in
dynamic multi-user environments and seldom offer node
side policy enforcement.
An active node monitoring solution is the Simple
Network Management Protocol [53], allowing a host to
request information from networked devices. This
approach allows users to request monitoring data from
nodes, but does so at a very high cost. An active monitoring
approach from the WSN field specifically is Sympathy [54].
This debugging tool allows a fine grained metric collection
of sensor nodes such as next hops, neighbours and uptime.
While being very powerful for debugging network prob-
lems during testing, it does not offer capabilities for more
fine-grained and evolvable decisions on what information
to monitor, and does not allow application components
to be limited with regards to node usage.
Passive monitoring approaches typically monitor WSN
traffic, interpret messages, and relays them to a server
infrastructure using a secondary network, such as Ethernet
[55] or Bluetooth [56]. While these approaches can moni-
tor the WSN without any node overhead, they do require
the deployment of a costly and redundant secondary
network, cannot interpret secure messages, detect node
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and cannot limit component’s node usage.
4.5. Application communication
Most middleware and protocol approaches do not dis-
tinguish between management and application communi-
cation, disregarding multi-level content, origin and target
driven security. Often you can only have one general secu-
rity setting, which is assumed to be the only setting in the
network [22,23], applied to management communication
and all kinds of application communication. There is a
however clear distinction between different types applica-
tion and management communication, and from who this
traffic originates. Current related work does not offer such
content dependent security policies, where certain applica-
tion data can be sent in the clear, while other application
data is required be encrypted and authenticated. While
some related work offers some level of fine-grained secu-
rity, it does so on a network or link level, rather than based
on data type.
4.6. Related work summary
Related work has proposed many partial solutions for a
secure node middleware. Yet no comprehensive node
security middleware has been proposed offering secure
management, network communication, application com-
munication, application deployment and application mon-
itoring. Neither has it been shown that such a secure
middleware offering extensive multi-user operations can
operate on resource constrained sensor platforms.5. Architecture
This section proposes the SecLooCI middleware archi-
tecture for securing wireless sensor nodes. The architec-
ture extends a generic pre-existing non-secure message
and component-based middleware with security exten-
sions. This section first describes a generic high level node
architecture for non-secured systems. Next this section
introduces the middleware modules required to ensure
data flow security as stated in the previous section. An
overview of the architecture can be found on Fig. 3. A short
list of provided services is shown for each of the compo-
nents, which authorised users can use to manage their
assets. The list of services only shows the add and set func-
tion for brevity. Retrieval and removal of configurations is
also present.
A typical reconfigurable node system is composed of
the following abstract components: the OS networking
layer, a deployment component, a message distribution
component, an application layer containing application
components providing application and serialisation logic,
and a service layer offering middleware and OS services.
Application components are responsible for interpreting
messages they receive and then calling the necessary ser-
vices to enact the requested application functionality. The
middleware services offer management of the messagedistribution system and application components. The OS
services offer sensing, actuation, timing and other services
to the components. A management component receives
management messages and calls the management services
to enact the requested management request.
The middleware must offer the following services to
users:
 deploy component: deploys a new component, and
sends back a node local component identifier.
 send management message: sends a management
request to the node, which is delivered to the cor-
rect manager component depending on type of
management message.
 add application subscription: example of manage-
ment request, adding a subscription to some infor-
mation in the message distribution component.
Source and destination can either be local or
remote. Such wiring policies allow the message dis-
tribution component to correctly deliver messages.
 set parameter: sets a parameter of a certain compo-
nent to the required value.
Take for example an upgradeable CoAP or HTTP server
which allows GET, PUT, POST and DELETE commands to
allow node reconfiguration, such as for example the Cali-
fornium CoAP Framework [57] or an Apache Tomcat ser-
ver. It is composed of the networking component,
providing an IPv6 layer. The message distribution compo-
nent looks at the PATH of the CoAP request to delegate
the request to the correct application component. This
component is called the local endpoint in Californium.
The PATH in combination with the command could be
regarded as message type. The application component
would look at the parameters of the request and the HTTP
command, interpret them and perform the necessary
actions either by retrieving data from other node services,
or setting parameters of certain configurations. Califor-
nium calls such application components local resources.
The server allows new components to be installed. Once
installed, the new component must register itself, indicat-
ing that it can receive messages sent to a certain PATH and
with a certain command, basically adding a subscription to
itself for the message type (PATH + COMMAND), from all
sources. Potentially the component could also send out
certain requests to services, indicated by a PATH name
and command, which the message distribution component
can then delegate locally or remotely depending on
installed subscriptions, allowing loose coupling of sensor
network components.
5.1. Security architecture
This section identifies seven necessary additions to the
non-secure system to secure the five data flows signifi-
cantly impacted by sharing:
Secure network component: Secures the network initiali-
sation data flow, enables secure joining, using and man-
aging of wireless network.
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Fig. 3. Overview of a secure Sensor Node Middleware. Components in white are non-secure component, components in grey are additional security
components.
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and encrypts the application and management commu-
nication data flows based on installed policies.
Service interception layer: Provides authorisation for the
management communication data flow and applica-
tions service usage data flow.
Security data store: Stores credentials, access policies
and usage policies for the different users, applications
and services.
Secure deployment component: Secures the application
deployment data flow to allow multiple different par-
ties to deploy application components.
Monitoring and enforcement component: Registers the
usage of the different application components and node
users, and potentially limits them.
Security management component: Allows users to add
and remove users, parties, roles, and security policies.
The following sections describe the different compo-
nents in more detail.
5.1.1. Secure network component
The secure network component secures the network
initialisation data flow. The secure network component
secures network level messages and ensures that no out-
siders can read the messages that travel in the network.
This paper assumes that nodes can communicate with each
other using a standardised MAC and IP layer. This paper
does not look at secure routing, since this topic is ade-
quately handled by related work, and is not significantly
changed by multi-party environments.
This component detects when the node enters a new
network. When this happens, the Network Owner (NO)receives the node’s and Platform Owner’s (PO’s) identity,
and some proof that the node is in fact in its network by
retrieving a node token. The NO then contacts the PO
securely using existing trust and certificate relationships.
The NO sends the proof that the node is in his network.
Once the PO verified this proof, the NO and PO negotiate
a gateway key, allowing the gateway to manage the node.
The PO encrypts this key into a token, together with some
security metadata, and hands it to the NO. The NO delivers
this token to the node using his network. The node vali-
dates this token, allowing the NO access to network man-
agement function. This component must provide the
following services:
 get platform owner ip: retrieve the IP address of the
PO.
 get node identity token: get a node token that
proves the node is present in the network of the NO.
 deploy network token: deploy a network token,
allowing the NO access to network management
services.
 deploy network key: set the network key, allows
the NO to manage the nodes network security
information.
Once the NO has deployed the token, he can add the
node to his Network Information Service. This service lists
all nodes in the network, together with their available ser-
vices. This allows the NO to keep an overview of the nodes
that are currently in the network. Nodes leaving the net-
work can either be detected by a heartbeat signal sent by
the node, or a relocation message which is sent to the NO
where the node was previously registered.
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The communication interceptor enables secure end-to-
end communication. It comprises of two sub-components:
one for management messages, and one for application
messages. The difference between the two is that manage-
ment messages can be attributed to users performing
reconfiguration or introspection of the node’s functional
composition. Application messages are not directly attrib-
utable to users, and do not perform reconfiguration but
rather only send functional information, such as informa-
tion on sensor data.
To provide secure communication, the communication
interceptor intercepts messages coming from or going to
the secure network component. Depending on the type of
message, message integrity, authenticity or confidentiality
must be ensured. The communication interceptor provides
this in an end to end fashion.
Management messages must be secured, i.e. authenti-
cated and encrypted, at all times to ensure the security of
the platform. They can be attributed to a user, either
directly or through a system that acts on behalf of a user.
The level of security for this kind of message is not evolv-
able, all messages must adhere to the same level of security
in order to access management services. The users allowed
to access services however is evolvable. The user Ids and
key material required for authentication is stored in the
user data store.
Application messages on the other hand may need no
security, or high security depending on the content of the
application. Application security policies specify the
required level of security and key material for different
message types. These policies are deployed on the sensor
nodes whenever a new application is deployed. Each time
the communication interceptor intercepts an application
message, these policies are checked and the necessary
operations are performed.
This paper proposes to separate encryption context
from encryption policy. The encryption context specifies
the security operations and consists of: (1) primitive:
hash/MAC/encrypted, (2) key material, and (3) algorithm.
The encryption policy declares which types of data are sent
using which security context. This allows multiple differ-
ent outgoing policies to use the same encryption context
and a single incoming policy to declare the required level
of security for a certain message type covering multiple
channels. This reduces overhead caused by encryption pol-
icies and key material, and it allows for easier evolution of
both security context (re-keying) and policy.
Incoming encryption policies state the needed security
primitive for the incoming messages depending on mes-
sage type, and message sources. This allows incoming mes-
sage policies to express security policies more compact. By
expressing the incoming policies potentially independent
of security context, it is more flexible and allows such pol-
icies to be expressed in a single short expression.
This component must offer the following services:
 add channel: adds a channel with a given algorithm
and security context. The security context contains
key length, and key bytes. add outgoing policy: adds a policy which specifies
which events need to be send over a given channel.
 add incoming policy: adds a policy which specifies
the required security level for given incoming data.
5.1.3. Service interception layer
The service interception layer checks whether the entity
accessing a service is authorised to access the service. A
service interception component is inserted between
application components and access restricted services. It
intercepts service request and decides whether or not the
request is allowed based on request meta-data and data
stored in the security data store component. Then it con-
tacts the Monitoring and Policy enforcement component
to update usage information.
5.1.4. Security data store
The security data store contains information of the
users currently installed on the system. This includes the
identification of the users currently installed, the key
material which is needed to authenticate them, and the
roles and permissions these users have to access the node
system. The security data store also contains the current
usage statistics by the different users, to be retrieved by
both the Application Owners and the Platform Owner.
The prototype assigns each service to a party. This party
owns the service and controls access to that service. A
party is a user or a group of users which provides the given
service. For access control, this paper proposes a role based
access control scheme, where users have roles at different
parties. This allows compact encoding of access rights. A
user can have a role with multiple parties at the same time,
one for each party. Each service is owned by only one
party. Each party dictates for each interface to the service
which role the accessing user is minimally required to
have. A user thus has access to a service if he has a role
which is equal or higher to the required role. This paper
initially proposes a simple hierarchical structure of roles:
viewer, user, manager and administrator. These simple
roles allow most requirements to be expressed. The archi-
tecture however is independent of the exact role structure,
and can be adapted to use other role models, or other
access control models.
This component must offer the following services:
 add token: add a pre-created token which adds a
user with pre-established security credentials.
 add user: add a user. Can only be called if current
user is authorised to add users.
 add party permission: give a user permission to
resources of certain party. Can only be called if cur-
rent user is authorised to add users to the given
party.
5.1.5. Secure deployment component
To ensure only authorised user can deploy valid compo-
nent, the middleware requires that a token is sent to the
node before the actual component. The node validates the
token, and ensures that the component that is deployed,
has been approved by the PO. The AO receives the tokens
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to deploy. This PO declares which applications are permit-
ted to be deployed together with the allowed range of per-
missions and resource restrictions. The token also contains
these resource restriction to ensure that the application of
the AO only uses the agreed amount of resources.
If the token is valid, and the component code matches
the token, the node installs the code and registers the
resource limitations polities with the monitoring compo-
nent. Once the application component is installed, the
node returns some component identifiers which allows
the AO to manage the component in future. This can be a
numeric or literal identifier. In case the token or compo-
nent validation fails, the AO returns a failure message.
This component must offer the following service:
 deploy token: deploy a security token. Token is
cryptographically signed, and dated. If successfully
decrypted and verified, the deploy component ser-
vice will become available.
 deploy component: deploy a component. Compo-
nent must match component hash contained in
token, and will be started with limitations as
described in token.
5.1.6. Monitoring and enforcement component
The monitoring and enforcement component monitors
the behaviour of users and applications on the sensor node.
It ensures that applications do not use excessive amounts
of data, nor users perform excessive amounts of introspec-
tion or reconfiguration requests. This component is depen-
dant on the Service Interceptor to monitor requests
performed by users and application components.
The monitoring and enforcement framework performs
two functions: data acquisition and policy limitation. Data
acquisition is done by filtering raw monitoring data with
monitoring profiles: a profile translates intercepted func-
tion calls to interception types and interception count,
basically indicating which counter (identified by the inter-
ception type) has to be incremented by which value. This
allows for aggregation and policy reasoning. Example
interception profiles could be (1) all memory used per user,
(2) memory used per component, (3) total processing
power used per party, aggregated over all components, or
(4) processing power used per component. Policy limita-
tions are done by resource restriction policies: these poli-
cies dictate how much of the certain resource can be
used. The resource is identified by the interception type
generated by the monitoring profile. It is thus clear that
policies can only be deployed if the profile generates the
correct interception type.
The framework requires components to only use the
instrumented interfaces. Since current embedded sensor
nodes do not offer strongmemory protection, this can cause
issues. However since the PO has control over which com-
ponents are deployed, he should verify that code does not
perform any illegal actions before allowing deployment.
This component must offer the following services:
 deploy profile: add a monitoring profile, specifying
which resources need to be monitored. add resource restriction policy: add a policy regarding a
certain component, specifying the amount of resources
that component can use.
5.2. Typical use case
This section presents a simple yet typical WSN use case
as described in Section 2.1, showing how the different
components are used across the lifecycle. The harbour cus-
toms wants to monitor the location of all containers in the
harbour network, which is provided by the harbour owner.
To do this, the harbour customs deploys a component that
listens to authenticated beacons and calculates location
based on these beacons. The component then broadcasts
this location, encrypted and authenticated towards the
harbour customs server.
Each party has a dedicated role in this example. The
harbour customs wants to deploy a component, making
him the Application Owner (AO). The harbour owner pro-
vides the network which allows all nodes from all parties
to communicate with each other and with server systems.
This makes him the Network Owner (NO). The logistics
provider provides the actual node platform used for
deployment. This makes him the Platform Owner (PO).
Likely the logistics provider also has applications of his
own, making him also an AO. However, this scenario doc-
uments the interactions when all three roles are enacted
by different parties. The remainder of this section will go
through all the steps in the lifecycle as shown on Fig. 2
and specify what all parties must do during each phase.5.2.1. Policy declaration
All parties have to declare whom they trust. The logis-
tics provider (PO) and harbour owner (NO) must trust each
other so the logistics provider can use the network pro-
vided by the harbour. The harbour owner must trust the
harbour customs, since the harbour owner must send a
notification each time a container enters. The harbour
customs must trust the harbour customs so the harbour
customs can deploy an application on the node of the logis-
tics provider. This is the policy declaration phase of the
lifecycle.5.2.2. Application creation
The harbour customs (AO) must create or purchase the
localisation application so it can deploy a component on
each node which enters the network of the harbour owner.
Likely a general localisation application will be created for
multiple harbours, and instantiated for each specific har-
bour with the specific beacon locations as parameter. A
simplified application exists out of three different compo-
nents, instantiated across the network: (1) the beacon
component broadcasts beacon location type message, con-
tain beacon-Id, timestamp, and other necessary metadata.
(2) The node component listens to beacon location type
messages, and sends out node location type messages. (3)
The data gathering component runs at the harbour cus-
toms, which listens to all node location type messages
and gathers the location of all nodes.
Applicaon Owner Owner server@ Plaorm Owner
Deployment Service
@ Sensor Node
1: Request permission
2: Grant permission &
token
4: Deploy component
3: Deploy token 
Fig. 5. Component deployment data flow.
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When the container arrives at the network of the har-
bour, the node detects that it has entered a new network,
and the node registration starts as shown on Fig. 4. The
secure network component contacts the harbour owner
(NO). The harbour owner retrieves the logistics provider’s
(PO) identity and the token proving the nodes entry in
the network. He then contacts the logistics provider and
negotiates cost, network key and parameters. The logistics
provider creates the node token and transmits it back. The
harbour owner deploys this token, sets the network key
and other potential network policies. Afterwards, he noti-
fies the harbour customs that a node has entered the net-
work. During this exchange the harbour owner can also
inform the logistics provider what the new (IPv6) address
of the node is, allowing the logistics provider to communi-
cate with his nodes.
5.2.4. Application instantiation
The harbour customs is notified that a new node has
entered, and instantiates his localisation application with
the new node. He contacts the logistics provider to request
to which services are available for the localisation applica-
tion. The logistics provider and harbour customs mutually
authenticate each other and negotiate policy and security
requirements. For example the logistics provider requires
that all location data of his nodes must be encrypted, while
customs would satisfy for authentication only. This negoti-
ation ends when the harbour customs and logistics pro-
vider agree on the component deployment and security
context (location is encrypted, beacons authenticated).
Once agreement is made, the harbour customs receives a
token from the logistics provider which he can use to
deploy the localisation component on the sensor node.
5.2.5. Application enactment
The harbour customs contacts the secure deployment
module of the node, sends the security token, and deploys
his code component as shown in Fig. 5. The node verifies
that the deployment request is authorised by checking
the deployment token. After the node received the compo-
nent, the node verifies that the component is authentic and
authorised. Once the component is verified, the node
install the component in its runtime environment. Next
the customs officer is installed as a users of the platform,
so he can manage his application component. The harbour
customs then sets up the necessary configurations, such as
the current beacons, the subscription for the node location
messages and security channel information: key material
to authenticate beacon location messages and encryptSecure network 
component
@ Sensor Node
Gateway 
@ Network Owner
1: Join request
Owner server
@ Plaorm Owner
2: Contact owner 
6: Network policies
5: Node token
3: Negoate trust & cost
4: Node token
Fig. 4. Network setup data flow.the node location messages as shown in Fig. 6. Once this
is done, the harbour customs starts the application. To
enact all these management operations, the harbour cus-
toms contacts the node using his credentials and manages
the node using reconfiguration requests. All these requests
are encrypted, authenticated and authorised by the com-
munication interceptor on the node.5.2.6. Application runtime
The final phase is the application runtime phase. During
this phase messages must flow securely between compo-
nents, and users must be monitored.5.2.6.1. Application communication. Once the component is
running, it will receive messages from beacons, and send
messages to the harbour customs. Each beacon location
message is authenticated by the application communica-
tion interceptor when coming from the secure network
layer as shown in Fig. 7. The interceptor drops all non valid
location messages. After interception the beacon message
is dispatched to the application component. This compo-
nent then calculates its location, and sends out the node’s
location using a node location message. This message is
then sent to the harbour customs. The application commu-
nication interceptor again intercepts this message and
encrypts it, following the outgoing application security
policy.5.2.6.2. Application monitoring. The monitoring frameworks
monitors the memory and processor usage of the compo-
nent, based on deployed resource limit policies, as agreed
upon in the contract. The monitor component tracks node
service usage by using the service interception proxies as
shown on Fig. 8 and ensures that the allowed limits are
not surpassed.5.2.7. Application removal
Once the container leaves the harbour, the logistics pro-
vider or customs removes the component and all associ-
ated policies. This frees up the used resources for other
future applications. All removal and clean-up commands
are again authenticated and authorised by the node.
Once all components have been cleaned up, and final
node usage data has been acquired, the logistics provider
can potentially charge the harbour customs for the node
usage. However, since the harbour customs can offer the
localisation service to the logistics provider, the logistics
provider likely will not require nor receive any payment.
Fig. 6. Service management data flow.
Fig. 7. Application communication data flow.
Fig. 8. Service usage data flow.
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This section presents the SecLooCI middleware that
implements the components discussed in the previous sec-
tion. This section goes over each the five data flows, iden-
tifies which security components from the architecture are
necessary to secure the data flow and details how they
interact. For each data flow the overhead in terms of
memory, processing and communication is listed. All
components are implemented and integrated in a single
prototype running the Contiki operating system [58] andthe LooCI component middleware [18]. The implementa-
tion has been tested on AVR Raven sensor nodes [59],
which have a 20 MHz MCU, 128 kB of ROM and 16 kB of
RAM. The prototype shows that this class of devices is
capable of supporting secure node sharing and implies that
all more capable classes of devices are also able to support
the necessary security middleware.
This section evaluates the framework protecting each
data flow in terms of communication, memory and
processing overhead. The test setup are single nodes in a
one-hop network directly communicating with the
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mentation that is deployed onto AVR Raven sensor nodes.
We chose this setup because: (1) many current industrial
deployments only show single hop networks with very lit-
tle mesh networking. (2) This evaluation setup allows for a
clear, straight forward and easily reproducible test setup.
(3) The security middleware enables sharing on a per node
basis, with all messages managing a single node. There is
currently no network-wide reconfiguration or manage-
ment operatives. The overhead of the middleware thus
needs to be evaluated on a per node basis instead of a net-
work wide basis. (4) There are currently no standard mesh
network test setup. Hence any networked results would
only have very limited to no comparison value to other
experiments. Additionally most networked system results
are simulations, while we chose for an actually deployed
prototype approach. (5) Recent work [60,61] has shown
that single hop networking is under certain conditions
more energy efficient compared to multi-hop routing,
and is easier to set up and maintain.
6.1. Assumptions
The creation of the middleware is based on a few
assumptions. Firstly the middleware assumes that nodes
always start in the care of the PO. The PO must deploy
the security and application middleware onto the node,
together with initial key material that will be used in the
different protocols. It is crucial that this deployment hap-
pens securely, since the following protocols depend on
the security and secrecy of this initial key material [62].
The initial key material are one or more long term sym-
metric keys. The middleware uses a pure symmetric key
approach since this significantly reduces the amount of
memory and processing needed for protocols and key
material. More capable nodes such as embedded PC’s or
smart phones can support other cryptographic primitives,
such as asymmetric cryptography. However, the goal of
this prototype is to explore the minimal system require-
ments to support shared node operation.
The system uses TCP and UDP on top of an IPv6 6LoW-
PAN based wireless sensor network with 802.15.4 MAC
layer. This allows server infrastructure and clients to easily
and transparently communicate with sensor nodes across
the globe, without having any notion of the exact WSN set-
tings. We assume that nodes receive global IPv6 addresses
from the Network Owner using IPv6 Stateless Address
Autoconfiguration [63]. This then enables any party any-
where in the world to communicate with the nodes. While
IPv6 and TCP are in theory not necessary for the system to
operate, in practice it greatly simplifies node mobility and
reliable end-to-end connectivity due to the standardisation
and universal integration of the protocols. Naturally other
protocols can be used, yet they would require adaptation
layers to be able to integrate with the Internet.
Lastly the prototypes aims to provide secure node oper-
ation andmanagement, however current sensor nodes offer
little memory protection. Hence when code is deployed
onto a sensor node, it has access to potentially all sensor
node memory. This paper assumes that certain counter-
measures are in place that prevent code components fromperforming such malicious actions either in hardware or
software. The hardware countermeasures prevent over
the air components from accessing prohibited memory
(i.e. the rest of the middleware) [64], while software coun-
termeasures ensure that only verified code can be deployed
[65]. This code verification can be done during the planning
phase: when the AO requests to use the POs node, the AO
must submit the components he is planning to deploy.
The PO can then verify the code of those components to
ensure platform integrity.
6.2. Underlying platform
The proposed security middleware secures the LooCI
middleware [18], which runs on top of the Contiki OS
[58]. LooCI is a component-based middleware comprised
of an execution environment, a component model and an
event-based binding model. The LooCI middleware cur-
rently supports the following platforms: Contiki on AVR
Ravens and Zigduino’s, SunSPOT sensor nodes, Android
smart phones, and OSGi java environments. The LooCI mid-
dleware comprises of the following parts as shown on
Fig. 9: (1) The LooCI networking layer, (2) the LooCI event
manager, (3) the LooCI component runtime, (4) the LooCI
management component, and (5) the LooCI code deploy-
ment module.
LooCI uses events as the sole mechanism to communi-
cate between components. A LooCI event is comprised of:
(1) sender information, (2) extension headers, (3) event
type, and (4) event payload. LooCI components are code
bundles, which are deployed over the air at runtime using
the LooCI code deployment module. Components are only
allowed to interact with each other through the usage of
LooCI events flowing over the distributed LooCI event
bus. Each component can subscribe to typed events or pub-
lish typed events himself. Components themselves are
oblivious however to the exact senders or receivers of
those events. This loose coupling promotes component
reuse in different distributed contexts, since there are no
hard wired connections between components.
The event manager implements the distributed event
bus. It keeps wiring tables, dictating which events of which
types from which components have to be sent where,
either locally to another component or remote to another
node. If it is sent across the network, the event manager
transfers the event to the LooCI networking layer. The net-
working layer translates outgoing events to UDP messages,
and incoming UDP messages to LooCI events. Reconfigura-
tion and inspection of the event manager is done by the
LooCI reconfiguration manager. All reconfiguration and
introspection of the LooCI middleware is done using LooCI
management events with the exception of deployment of
new applications, which uses an optimised deployment
protocol.
The overhead of Contiki OS and LooCI is small, yet sig-
nificant for resource constrained environments. Contiki
OS requires 42688 B of ROM and 9712 B of RAM memory
to operate. This includes the uIP stack for networking and
other libraries for memory and sensor management. The
LooCI middleware requires another 24942 B of ROM and
2644 B of RAM on top of the Contiki OS.
LooCI Component Runtime
LooCI Event Manager
Component A Component B Reconfiguration
Engine
Publish Receive Receive ReceivePublish Publish
OS Networking Layer
LooCI Networking Layer
LooCI Deployment
 Module
Add/remove 
component
Receive event Send event
Receive data Code
Send data
Manages
Fig. 9. Overview of the LooCI component middleware.
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crypto-lib [66], which offers software implementations of
most popular encryption, authentication and integrity
algorithms such as AES, SHA, and CMAC. Note that crypto-
graphic algorithm overhead is listed with each protocol,
but these algorithms are reused across multiple protocols.
To get a full detailed overview of the overhead, please refer
to Table 5 at the end of this chapter.
The prototypes operates on top of LooCI, yet the con-
cepts of the architecture and the prototype can be applied
to any system that matches the general non-secure system
architecture as presented in Section 5.
6.3. Secure network initialisation
The secure network initialisation framework (MASY
[24]) secures the network initialisation data flow on the
node and requires the secure network component. Fig. 10
shows the secure initialisation data flow in detail. This sec-
tion provides a limited overview of the protocol. For more
information, please refer to the paper for more in depth
information.
The protocol operates as follows: when a node detects
that it has entered a new sensor network, it sends out a
hello message containing the identity of its PO, its name
and a timestamp. This is sent as one package to reduce
network overhead. The hello message is authenticated
using the long term node secret key. Currently the iden-
tity of the PO is encoded as an IPv4 address. Possible alter-
natives are DNS and IPv6, however this would require
larger string or byte identifiers to be exchanged, increas-
ing overhead. When a node in the network detects this
hello message, it forwards this message towards the gate-
way. Using the token, the NO contacts the PO and negoti-
ates network key and policy information. When the NO
and PO reach agreement, the PO creates a small token
containing the NO key and the timestamp to ensure fresh-
ness. The NO installs this token at the sensor node,
enabling the node to communicate securely as discussed
in Section 5.1.1.This section evaluates the communication, memory,
and processing overhead of the secure network compo-
nent. This section evaluates the set-up of the secure key
material, assuming other policy deployment actions can
be done after the key material has been deployed. The
results are compared to TinySec [23] as reference for an
efficient WSN secure network layer.
Communication overhead: Two types of messages are
transmitted across the network: Hello messages, which are
32 bytes and Reply messages, which are 44 bytes. The
exact format of these messages is shown in Fig. 11. These
figures ignore MAC/IP layer overhead. During communica-
tion, all messages can be encrypted, authenticated or
integrity checked, depending on the network policy. The
communication overhead for these cryptographic primi-
tives is limited to the additional MAC. The current imple-
mentation uses an 8 B MAC to ensure message integrity.
TinySec does not offer any clear registration functionality.
TinySec also uses an 8 B MAC during normal communica-
tion, equalling the communication overhead during
operations.
Memory overhead: The total ROM overhead of the
component is 5690 B and consists of: (a) the component
implementation (946 B), and (b) overhead for AES encryp-
tion algorithm (4746 B). The total RAM overhead of the
secure network component is 218 B and consists of the
encryption context and message buffers. TinySec has a
ROM overhead of 7148 B and RAM overhead of 728 B,
which is comparable to the secure network component.
Processing overhead: The secure network component
operates at hello packet creation, reply packet reception,
and when a message is sent to or received from the net-
work. The creation of a hello packet requires the encryp-
tion of 16 B of data, requiring one AES operation. This
takes a total time of approximately 2 ms using an AES soft-
ware implementation. Receiving the network reply also
only requires the decryption and authentication of 16 B
of data, again taking approximately 2 ms. Encrypting and
decrypting network packages also requires about 2 ms
per 16 B block. To give a comparison, sending a plain
1: hello:M,CompIP,TS,{msg}SK
2: relay hello
3: {hello,GK}SSL
4: reply: M,{TS,GK}SK
5: relay reply
6: reply
Gateway
Relaying nodeNode entering new 
network with MAC M
Back-end server @ 
CompIP
msg
Fig. 10. Secure network setup key exchange protocol.
NodeMAC home IP addr TimeStamp Signature
8B 4B 4B 16B
(a) MASY Hello message
NodeMAC TimeStamp Group key (Enc) Signature
8B 4B 16B 16B
(b) MASY Reply message
Fig. 11. Packet format of the MASY Hello message. Signature is signed, and group key is encrypted with the node unique key, only known to the sensor node
and Platform Owner.
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Sec uses two different block ciphers to process messages.
For encrypting a 16 B message using RC5 requires
1.04 ms, while SkipJack requires 1.52 ms.
6.4. Secure application deployment
The secure deployment component implements the
secure application deployment component as explained
in Section 5.1.5. It listens to the network for user connec-
tions. When a user connects to it, it first must send a small
token containing application hash, resource usage limits
and owner information. If the token is valid, the secure
deployment component listens for the component code,
installs it, and deploys the usage limitation policies listed
in the token. If the token is invalid, the connection is
closed. This section evaluates the communication, mem-
ory, and processing overhead of the secure deployment
component and compares it to the Sluice secure deploy-
ment protocol [46]. For more information on the SASha
secure deployment system, please refer to the paper [25].
Communication overhead: The only communication
overhead of the secure deployment component is the addi-
tional token, which is sent before the actual deployment.The total size of this token is 56–78 B. Fig. 12 shows the
exact format of the token. The deployment secret key is
optional. The token is encrypted and authentication using
AES128-CCM with 8 B MAC, using the nodes long term
secret key. This is the only mandatory network overhead.
Since a typical component has a size of 1000–2000 B, it
entails a communication overhead of 2–5%. Sluice uses a
similarly sized token of 44 B.
Memory overhead: The secure deployment component
has a ROM overhead of 8.1 kB and a RAM overhead of 504
B. Table 1 contains a more detailed memory overhead anal-
ysis. To compare, Sluice has a ROM overhead of 9 kB and
ROM overhead of 2000 B. The larger RAM overhead of
Sluice is due to larger buffer size.
Processing overhead: The delay to deployment with
added security consists of the transmission and validation
of the application token and validation of the component.
Since most application components are more than thou-
sand bytes large, the additional delay for sending a token
remains limited to a few percent. No tests were performed
to test these delays.
The time overhead of the computation on the node is
estimated in the hundreds of milliseconds. Decrypting
of one 64 B block takes 8 ms, hashing 6.5 ms. A small
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Flags SendFreq Send Limit Wakeup
Rom limit Ram Limit
Key
Oponal field
Component TimeoutOwner ID
  ComponentHash (32B)
TokenId Timestamp
Token Timeout Length
Fig. 12. Overview of the secure deployment token. The key is optional and used if the AO required confidential deployment. Token overhead is thus either
56 or 72 bytes. The token is transmitted encrypted using AES128 and the long term node key.
Table 1
Secure application deployment memory overhead.
ROM (kB) RAM(B)
AES crypto lib 4.2 Crypto buffer 240
SHA-2 crypto lib 1.8 Token and key buffer 184
Deployment component 2.3 Deployment buffer 80
Total ROM 8.1 Total RAM 504
Sluice 9 Total RAM 2000
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64 ⁄ (8 + 6.5) ms = 232 ms. Sluice uses the Elliptic Curve
Digital Cryptography Signature algorithm, an asymmetric
key algorithm. Due to this, the verification of a token takes
30–35 s, due to ECC operations, which is significantly
longer than the proposed system.
The PO’s server, which manages and grants the tokens
and the AO’s management agent which requests the tokens
and deploys the applications are both implemented in Java.6.5. Secure application management
The secure application management framework allows
for the secure management of the sensor node by authen-
ticating and authorising management messages. The
framework consists of: a communication interceptor man-
agement component, a service call interceptor, a user data
store, and a user management service. For more informa-
tion on the implementation of the framework, please refer
to the paper [26].
The identify users, the system uses a 2 B numeric use-
rID. This compact user identification can be node or net-
work unique. Each authenticated message is encrypted
using AES128-CCM and has an 8 B MAC in the secure pay-
load header to verify message authenticity and integrity. At
service call, the service interceptor intercepts the call and
verifies the user is allowed to access the service based on
Roles and Attributes of the calling user.
The current prototype implements a hierarchical role
based access control scheme. 4 roles are defined: viewer,
user, manager, and admin, each with increasing powers
of viewing application state, and modifying and deleting
applications. A viewer can only see data, users can sub-
scribe to existing data producing components, managers
can adapt the settings of these components, and admins
can influence the lifecycle (pausing, removing and starting
components). These roles allow for a simple, clear and
compact description of required role for each functionality.However, the framework allows parties to easily adapt the
system and implement their own access control scheme.
This section evaluates the communication, memory,
and processing overhead of the secure application manage-
ment framework. This approach is compared to a symmet-
ric key approach (TinySec [23]) and a asymmetric key
approach (Authenticated Querying (AQ) by Beneson et al.
[51]).
Communication overhead: The secure application
management framework requires additional security infor-
mation to be added to each management message. This
overhead is 14 B and is detailed in Fig. 13. The payload of
the messages is currently not padded to ensure the mini-
mal size of reconfiguration messages. TinySec has a mes-
sage overhead of 8 B, AQ has a message overhead of 20 B,
both are comparable to the proposed system (see Fig. 14).
To register a user, it is possible to deploy a user token to
the user management system. This requires the transmis-
sion of a token over the network containing the following
fields: userId, partyId, nodeRole, partyRole, user-Key, time-
stamp, timeOut, user-timeout, and MAC. This token has a
total message size of 40 B and is encrypted with the node’s
long term secret key. Installing the user by token is one
option to allow new users to be added. Alternatively a ser-
vice request can be called which has the same communica-
tion overhead, since the same data has to be transmitted.
To compare, AQ has a user registration token size of 114
B due to ECC signature. TinySec does not mention any user
registration token.
Memory overhead: The ROM overhead of the applica-
tion management component is 12.15 kB, and the RAM
overhead is 438 B. Table 2 contains a detailed overview
of the overhead. To compare, TinySec has a ROM overhead
of 7148 B and RAM overhead of 728 B, AQ has a signifi-
cantly larger ROM and RAM overhead of respectively
45500 B and 2000 B.
Processing overhead: The secure application manage-
ment framework operates at three point in the call chain:
at message reception, at service call, and at message
transmission. The overhead of message transmission and
reception are almost identical and composed of retrieving
the user’s key information from the user data store, and
then either encrypting or decrypting the message. The
authentication of a message comprises of (a) retrieving
the userId from the request message, (b) retrieving the
user information from the user data store, and (c)
decrypting and verifying the authenticity of the message
and takes ca 4 ms for a 32 B management request (mostly
LooCI SecLooCI SecLooCI SecLooCI SecLooCI
header User Header MAC Header TimeStamp Payload (enc)
6B 4B 10B 6B *
Fig. 13. Packet format of a SecLooCI management communication message.
Networking Layer
Marshalling Layer      
Service Execuon 
Layer
Authencaon Interceptor
Authorisaon Layer: 
PEP & PDP
SE Component 1 SE Component 2 User Management SE Component : PAP
Auth Proxy 1 Auth Proxy 2 User Management Auth Proxy
Marshaller 1 Marshaller 2 User Management Marshaller
User Database:
PIP
Manages
Authorisaon
informaon
Authencaon 
Informaon
Service Request
Authencated Service request
Service Call
Authorised Service Call
Service Call
Authorised Service Call
Service Call
Authorised Service Call
Fig. 14. Overview of the application management protocol. Colored parts are components added for security: authentication interceptor (orange),
authorisation framework (yellow), and user management (green). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred
to the web version of this article.)
Table 2
Secure application management memory overhead.
ROM (B) RAM(B)
AES-CCM crypto lib 4746 User information store 238
Communication interceptor 407 Encryption buffer 200
Event encryption support 1150
Permission module 1158
Interception proxies 3296
Security management component 1393
Total ROM 12150 Total RAM 438
TinySec ROM 7148 TinySec RAM 728
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time, since the main overhead is the encryption of the
request. The authorisation of a message is much faster. It
comprises of (a) a proxy interception of a service message,
(b) retrieving user access rights, and (c) matching access
rights with the current request and requires only tens of
nanoseconds. TinySec has a message processing overhead
of only 1.04 ms or 1.52 ms, due to the usage of different
encryption algorithms (RC5/SkipJack), and different
hardware.
A user can register himself with the system using a
token. This message is not intercepted by the Communica-
tion Interceptor to allow anyone to send such a token.
However, the service itself verifies the integrity and valid-
ity of the token by decrypting and authenticating the
token. Since the token size is about 40 B this takes about
6 ms to decrypt and verify the token. To compare, AQ
requires 440000 ms to validate the user registration token
due to the usage of asymmetric cryptography, and requir-
ing a certificate chain. TinySec does not allow for user
registration.
6.6. Secure application communication
The secure application communication framework
ensures that the application communication of thedifferent application components is transmitted securely.
In the LooCI Component middleware, communication
happens using typed events, source component and desti-
nation node. As stated before, this component distin-
guishes between encryption contexts, outgoing policies
and incoming policies. Encryption contexts identify a secu-
rity context which entails algorithm type, algorithm iden-
tification, key material and security level. Outgoing
policies dictate which events should be transmitted on
which channel based on event type, source component
and destination. Incoming policies dictate which level of
security is required for certain events, and which events
are allowed to pass, based on source node, source compo-
nent, event type and context. An overview of the decision
logic can be found in Fig. 16.
When a message is dispatched from the application
middleware, it is checked against the outgoing policies. If
the event matches an outgoing policy, the associated chan-
nel is retrieved and the event is processed according to the
channel parameters. If an event matches multiple policies,
only the first matching policy is considered, which is the
policy which has been on the node the longest. Overlap-
ping policies can be detected based on the source, destina-
tion and event type of the channel.
When an event comes up from the network stack, the
encryption context is checked against relevant incoming
J. Maerien et al. / Ad Hoc Networks 25 (2015) 141–169 159policies. If the context is present, the matching security
primitive is performed. Once the verification is completed,
the event is matched against the incoming policies. The
incoming policies dictate the minimal level of security that
is required for an event to pass. It is also possible to dictate
a blocking policy that blocks the matching events, unless
another policy explicitly allows it. If the context is not
present, and the event is not encrypted, than the event is
checked against the blocking policies.
This section evaluates the communication, memory,
and processing overhead of the secure application commu-
nication component, and compares it with TinySec [23].
Communication overhead: The prototype implements
three types of security policies: integrity, authenticity and
confidentiality. Each message is identified by a (a) security
information header, containing the channelId (2 B), and (b)
a security payload, containing the hash or mac payload, as
shown in Fig. 15. The size of the security payload depends
on the exact policy installed. The prototype allows for a
flexible choice of security and supports multiple lengths
of security messages. For integrity and authenticity a secu-
rity payload of 4, 8, 16 and 32 B is supported, for confiden-
tiality a MAC size of 0, 4, 8 and 16 B is supported.
The total message overhead is 4, 10, 14, 22 or 38 B
depending on the security payload size, and thus the level
of security. The AO can chose his level of security depend-
ing on the security requirements of the application, the
available resources of the sensor node and the preferences
of the POs involved in the deployment. TinySec has a fixed
MAC overhead of 8 B.
Memory overhead: The prototype has total ROM over-
head of 10900 B and a RAM overhead of 97 B assuming 2
channels, 1 incoming and 1 outgoing policy. Transmission
buffers and encryption buffers are not included in this,
and depend on specific transmissions and encryption pro-
tocols. Table 3 shows the overhead figures in more detail.
Note that 7744 B of the implementation overhead is taken
up by cryptographic algorithms, which are reused in other
parts of the security middleware. TinySec has a ROM over-
head of 7148 B and RAM overhead of 728 B.
Processing overhead: Processing a 32 B message takes:
to encrypt/decrypt the message using AES: 4 ms, to
authenticate or verify a message using AES-CMAC: 4 ms,
to verify message integrity using SHA1: 13.6 ms. While this
processing overhead is significant, it is still only a few mil-
liseconds of processing overhead. In most use cases this is a
tolerable overhead. TinySec has a message processing
overhead of only 1.04 ms or 1.52 ms, due to the usage of
different encryption algorithms (RC5/SkipJack).
6.7. Monitoring and enforcement
The monitoring and enforcement component FAMoS
[27] monitors node usage by different components and
users and allows policy enforcement. An overview of theLooCI SecLooCI SecLooCI
header Channel Header SecInfo Hea
6B 4B 0/6/10/18 /3
Fig. 15. Packet format of a SecLooCI appmonitoring and enforcement component is shown in
Fig. 17.
The monitoring and enforcement framework operates
by instrumenting the functions required to use the net-
work, memory and sensors. It defines multiple different
hooks in the network to be able to monitor performance
on different levels of the network, including the MAC and
IP layer. These hooks call the monitoring component when
data requests or data passes through them.
The monitoring and enforcement component on the
node is comprised of four bocks: the core, the profile, the
policy and the flush component. The monitor core block
maintains the buckets, which are basically resource coun-
ters that keep track of the resource usages. A bucket con-
sists of a 32 bits bucket identifier and a 16 bits counter.
The range of bucket identifies allows for encoding of differ-
ent kinds of usage, and parts of the identifier can contain
for example userId or componentId. The profile block con-
tains the logic which decides which buckets need to be
incremented. The policy block checks whether the node
usage is allows, and updates internal policy buckets, which
operate in a leaky bucket fashion. Finally, the core adds all
bucket updates to its internally saved reporting buckets.
On a fixed schedule the monitor flush block flushes the
acquired reporting buckets or when the 16 bits buckets
are almost overflowing.
The monitoring and enforcement component can
potentially operate independent from the other proposed
pillars. However, by using the additional security pillars,
the monitoring traffic benefits from the additional security
features presented, such as secure deployment and secure
end-to-end communication.
This section evaluates the communication, memory,
and processing overhead of the monitoring and enforce-
ment component implementation on an AVR raven and
compares it to the Sympathy network debugger [54].
Communication overhead: The communication usage
can be divided into two parts: (a) the overhead to send a
monitoring flush packet and (b) the overhead to install a
policy. The overhead to send a monitoring flush packet
depends on the flush interval. A flush packet has a minimal
size of 8 B. Each bucket that contains data extends this
packet size with 6 B. On top of this is the network over-
head, which can be 30–40 B of IP and MAC headers.
Deploying a policy has a communication overhead of 8 B
per policy. Sympathy does not explicitly mention monitor-
ing packet size or overhead. Assuming 4 B per timestamp
and 2 B per counter, Sympathy has a monitoring message
size of 20 B, which is comparable to the proposed
component.
Memory overhead: The basic framework without pol-
icy enforcement requires 3290 B of ROM and 216 B of
RAM. The policy enforcement framework requires another
2140 B of ROM and 221 B of RAM. This is for a minimal
monitoring policy. More complex policies will requireSecLooCI Event
der TimeStamp* Payload
4 B 6B *
lication communication message.
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Fig. 16. Flowchart of the decision tree of policy interpretation at sending and receiving application messages.
Table 3
Secure application communication memory overhead.
ROM (B) RAM(B)
Communication interceptor 1627 Storage buffer overhead 21
Security management component 1529 Overhead per channel 31
AES with CCM 4746 Overhead per Inc. pol 7
AES-CMAC 1018 Overhead per out pol 7
SHA256 1980
Total ROM 10900 Total RAM (2 ch, 1 in, 1 out) 97
TinySec ROM 7148 TinySec RAM 728
Sensor Node Plaorm Owner’s
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Sensor Access
Monitor and Enforcement Component
Monitor
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Fig. 17. Overview of the monitoring and enforcement component.
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ing logic, and amount of buckets to monitor. Sympathy has
an overhead of 47 B of RAM and 1558 B of ROM. This lower
overhead is due to the fact that Sympathy has fixed moni-
toring which cannot be updated or changed, and cannot
enforce policies, so the monitoring and enforcement com-
ponent has a slightly higher overhead for some additional
features.
Processing overhead: The processing overhead of the
prototype is minimally 57 ns. This can run up to 200 ns
or more depending on the complexity of the monitoring
and enforcement policies. The default case of sending apacket over the network takes on average 1260 ns network
processing, and 2228 ns to actually transmit the message,
totalling at 3488 ns. 200 ns is only a 5.8% additional over-
head. Sympathy does not mention any processing over-
head, but due to the static and simple monitoring policy
of Sympathy, this paper assumes it can be compared to a
very simple monitoring policy, requiring 50 ns.
7. Discussion and evaluation
This section presents the integrated evaluation, and dis-
cusses these results. First it provides a general overview of
Table 4
SecLooCI middleware memory overhead. The overhead of the security suite
is comparable to the overhead of the non-secure middleware, but clearly
still within the possibilities of a low power sensor node.
ROM (B) % RAM
(B)
%
Contiki operating system 42688 32.6 9712 59.3
LooCI middleware 24942 19.0 2644 16.1
SecLooCI security suite 27372 20.9 1525 9.3
Total binary 95002 72.5 13881 84.7
Total available on AVR Raven 131072 100.0 16384 100.0
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applied evaluation of this comprehensive middleware
using the typical use case proposed in Section 5.2. Next it
discusses how the architecture fulfils all non-functional
requirements as listed in Section 3 and examines how
the proposed security architecture and middleware meets
the different proposed security requirements by analysing
potential attacks. Finally this section looks at some inter-
esting future work.
7.1. Prototype implementation
This section briefly presents the integrated security
architecture and prototype of the components as discussed
in the previous sections and evaluates on the integrated
figures. The SecLooCI architecture has seven additional
components over the standard LooCI middleware, in accor-
dance with the general security architecture and as show
in Fig. 3:
 The secure network component secures the net-
work initialisation, which is transparent to the
upper and lower layers, and allows the creation of
a sensor node registry at the gateway.
 The communication interceptor component per-
forms the authentication and encryption for
application and management communication.
 The secure deployment component secures the
application deployment.
 The security manager component offers security
management services such as user installation,
channel and policy management for the application
security, and policy management for the monitor-
ing and enforcement component.
 The authorisation and interception service proxy
provides the interception points necessary to
enable authorisation of management communi-
cation and monitoring of application service
usage.
 The monitoring and enforcement component
monitors the network and the application service
usage, and potentially also the different users of
the network.
 The security data store component contains the
necessary user and policy information needed for
the application and management message security
protocols to operate.
These seven components are implemented and inte-
grated on the AVR Raven running the Contiki OS and the
LooCI Component Middleware. Table 4 shows an overview
of the overhead of the SecLooCI middleware compared to
the unsecured LooCI and Contiki. Table 5 shows the ROM
and RAM overhead of the different components of the mid-
dleware. The total additional overhead for the security
middleware including cryptographic primitives is 27372
B of ROM and 1525 B of RAM memory. This is a significant
amount of memory for these memory constrained devices.
However, the security features which are offered by this
middleware are necessary for the next generation of sensor
network applications, and the implementation of themiddleware shows that it is feasible to implement the
required features on the targeted memory constrained
devices, with a significant yet acceptable overhead.
Note that 28.3% of ROM and 9.3% of RAM is due to cryp-
tographic primitives. A current trend is to implement these
algorithms in hardware, to reduce processing cost and
memory overhead. This would significantly reduce the
overhead of the framework.7.2. Test scenario and measurements
This section implements the end to end scenario pre-
sented in Section 5.2. This test is a prototypical test for a
single hop network, which we use as our default test sce-
nario as discussed at the start of Section 6. The time over-
head and message size of each node interaction is
stipulated in this scenario. Only node interactions are
listed, excluding back-end to back-end communication,
since only sensor node interactions influence sensor node
lifetime. The memory overhead of the different compo-
nents, which is mostly static, can be found in the previous
section. For each interaction the total cost is listed. For an
in depth view of all the different costs, please refer to
Table 6. The test setup consists of two sensor nodes and
a gateway in a one hop network. The scenario does not
consider multi-hop networking. Network and MAC layer
overhead is not considered.
Network setup The first step in network setup is the
beacon that is sent across the network. This beacon cur-
rently has a size of 8 B containing the MAC address of
the gateway. Once received, the node generates the node
token of 32 B, and transmits it. This takes ca 4 ms, mostly
encryption. The NO receives and processes the token, con-
tacts the PO, receives a network token of ca 44 B, and trans-
mits it back to the node which takes on average ca 100 ms.
Most of this time the node is waiting for a reply to his key
request. The total cost is 32 B sent, 52 B received, taking ca
100 ms, of which 12 ms is spent computing by the node.
Application deployment The next node interaction is
the customs officer who wants to deploy a new application
component. In this case, the customs officer deploys a
localisation component, which listens to location events,
does some very simple distance estimation in two dimen-
sions based on the delay of the event and beacon location,
and publishes its location every 60 s if it has received a
beacon. A prototype component has a size of 2121 B. To
deploy the component, the customs officer first sends the
application token, with a size of 56 B, and then sends the
Table 5
Detailed SecLooCI middleware memory overhead. A significant amount of ROM and RAM is used for the encryption algorithms. Hardware
implementations could reduce this overhead.
ROM (B) % RAM (B) %
Secure network component 946 3.5 218 14.3
Communication interceptor component 2034 7.4 129 8.5
Secure deployment component 512 1.9 20 1.3
Security manager component 2780 10.2 295 19.3
Authorisation/ interception proxies 3296 12.0 8 0.5
Security data store component 1558 5.7 238 15.6
Monitoring component 3290 12.0 216 14.2
Policy enforcement component 2140 7.8 221 14.5
Middleware tools 3072 11.2 38 2.5
Encryption algorithms 7744 28.3 142 9.3
Total SecLooCI usage 27372 100.0 1525 100.0
Table 6
Overview of the SecLooCI middleware overhead. Daily overhead calculated assuming one incoming and outgoing message per minute. Table shows that
processing overhead is comparable to one day of operation. Transmission overhead is equal to about 19 days of operation.
LooCI % SecLooCI % Crypto % Total
Network setup sent(B) 0 0.0 16 50.0 16 50 32
Network setup received(B) 0 0.0 36 50.0 16 50 52
Network setup processing(ms) 0 0.0 0 0 12 100 12
Deploy sent(B) 2 100 0 0.0 0 0.0 2
Deploy received(B) 2121 97.4 16 0.7 40 1.8 2177
Deploy processing(ms) 10000 97.8 0 0 223 2.2 10223
Mgt sent(B) 172 29.3 303 51.6 112 19.1 587
Mgt received(B) 164 28.6 297 51.8 112 19.5 573
Mgt processing(ms) 0.42 0.7 0.28 0.5 56 98.8 56.7
Total sent(B) 174 28.0 319 51.4 128 20.6 621
Total received(B) 2285 81.5 349 12.5 168 6.0 2802
Total processing(ms) 10000 97.2 0 0 291 2.8 10291
App comm sent per message(B) 9 39.1 6 26.1 8 34.8 23
App comm rec per message(B) 9 39.1 6 26.1 8 34.8 23
Time to process a message(ms) 5 38.5 0 0.0 8 61.5 13
App comm sent per day(B) 12960 39.1 8 640 26.1 11520 34.8 33120
App comm rec per day(B) 12960 39.1 8 640 26.1 11520 34.8 33120
Daily message processing(ms) 7200 38.5 0 0.0 11520 61.5 18720
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component identifier, totalling 2 B. This process takes
about 12.3 s. Only about 8 ms were spent decrypting the
token, and 215 ms performing the hashing. This totals at
ca 2177 B received, 2 B sent, taking ca 12.3 s, of which
223 ms spent on crypto operations, and ca 10 s spent writ-
ing to flash memory. The remaining time is communication
overhead.
Application management The following interaction is
the management of the users and node applications. The
necessary operations are: deployment of the user token
by the Customs Officer, entering the five beacon locations
in the application, entering the necessary subscriptions,
adding the security policies (incoming channel and policy,
outgoing channel and policy, and monitoring policy), and
activating the component. The policies use an 8 B MAC
for encryption and authentication. Each of these interac-
tions is a service call by the customs officer to the manage-
ment component. A total of 14 configuration requests are
needed. The prototype performed this configuration in an
automated way, taking about 2.2 s. Each request requires
a minimal overhead of 14 B for security headers, and 6 of
the 14 messages are security management messages. The
total cost is 587 B sent, 573 B received, taking ca 2.2 s.Application communication At this point, the applica-
tion is running and communicating over secured channels.
When a message enters the node, it is intercepted by the
communication interceptor, the incoming channel is
retrieved, the message decrypted and checked against
incoming policies. This takes about 4 ms. Then the message
is sent up to the LooCI Event Manager, which delivers it to
the localisation component. When the timer expires, the
localisation component calculates its current position
based on available information, and broadcasts it. The
broadcast is logged by the monitoring component, but only
takes a few nanoseconds. The event manager receives the
event and routes it to the network. The communication
interceptor intercepts it, checks incoming policies and
encrypts it, which takes again about 4 ms. The largest part
of this overhead is encryption. The total process of sending
only takes about 5 ms from event creation by the localisa-
tion component, until it is sent over the wire. The send
overhead is the cost for encrypting and authenticating
the event, requiring 14 B. The message itself is 9 B. Hence,
the total cost is 23 B sent, 23 B received, taking ca 13 ms.
Assuming one message per minute, this becomes a daily
total cost of 33120 B sent, 33120 B received, and
18720 ms spent processing.
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This section looks at how the proposed SecLooCI archi-
tecture handles the different non-functional concerns as
listed in Section 3.3. It shows that the proposed architec-
ture and reference implementation meet the requirements.
7.3.1. Evolvability
The middleware allows new sensor network applica-
tions to be added at runtime, and to securely manage these
applications by for example adding new subscriptions, or
adding or removing application security policies. The evo-
lution of network applications is enabled by the secure
deployment of software components, and secure manage-
ment framework. The secure deployment framework
ensure that only components that have been approved by
the Platform Owner (PO) can be deployed, and the PO
can specify additional resource constraints to ensure those
components do not use too many node resources. The
secure management framework ensure that users can only
perform authorised evolution actions.
7.3.2. Performance
The integrated prototype shows that the overhead of
the SecLooCI middleware is small enough to still fit on
micro-controller level of devices. Section 7.1 shows that
the overhead of the static system is significant, but compa-
rable to other security solutions proposed by related work.
Section 7.2 shows that the prototype communication over-
head from security is fairly limited, and exists mostly of
necessary security data. This shows that sharing nodes
with multiple parties does not cause a large overhead com-
pared to a secure single user single party environment.
7.3.3. Transparency
All security features are provided at a middleware level
and are policy driven. The different owners can specify
their security preferences in high level, expressive policies.
These policies are then deployed in a compressed (binary)
format on the nodes, where they are enforced wherever
applicable. Additionally, because the security policies are
enforced on a middleware level, application developers
do not need to be concerned about security, nor do they
have to implement their own protocols. This significantly
increases security since usually application developers
are not security experts. Security by policy costs some per-
formance as shown in Section 7.1, but the evaluation has
shown this cost is manageable.
7.3.4. Compatibility
The application deployment features, and the fine
grained application security features ensure that the
required communication patterns can be supported. By
being able to deploy high level policies at both the sender
and the receiver, one to one, many to one, one to many, or
many to many communications can be secured. Addition-
ally, these communication patterns can be secured in an
end-to-end fashion, ensuring that only those parties which
are authorised to receive the data, are able to encrypt/
decrypt the messages. Additionally, by having this policy
driven security, the system can differentiate betweeninformation which can be shared with all, most, some or
no other parties.
7.3.5. Flexibility
The application communication security policies
provide multiple different levels of security with multiple
different algorithms. Security policies specify whether the
communication needs to be secured using integrity,
authenticity, or confidentiality ensuring protocols. Addi-
tionally the system can chose the length of authentication
code, to be able to make a trade-off between communica-
tion size and security. The application user can chose
which policy to apply depending on the application
requirements and performance costs. Additionally by using
policies and being able to support and deploy new and
other security algorithms, the system or user can update
and change algorithms in its network, to be able to meet
changing security requirements.
7.3.6. Shareability
The network setup, deployment and management mod-
ules clearly offer support for multiple users from multiple
different parties to securely share sensor node services and
ensure secure data exchanges. The network setup data
flow allows network owners to share their network with
multiple Platform Owners. The secure deployment, secure
management and application monitoring data flow allow
Platform Owners to share their node services with multiple
other application owners. By having end to end security
policies, application owners can still be sure of their appli-
cation’s communication security, even while using relaying
functionality of untrusted nodes, as long as he trusts the
Platform Owners of which he uses the services.
7.3.7. Fault tolerance
The architecture can continue to operate with reduced
functionality depending on which party and which func-
tionality becomes unavailable. When the network owner’s
registration server goes offline, then no new nodes can join
the network. However, all nodes that are in the network
can continue to operate, and send data to their owners
assuming the communication with the Internet is avail-
able. AOs can deploy an instantiate new applications, and
manage existing application by contacting the relevant
POs. When an Internet connection becomes unavailable,
then no users can communicate with the nodes, nor can
the nodes communicate with back-end infrastructure.
However, any local functionality will continue to operate.
Additionally, some nodes will be equipped with alternate
Internet connections such as GSM and satellite. These
nodes can then set up a new network, and can offer their
networking service to other nodes and owners.
When a Platform Owner goes offline, then his nodes can
no longer be used in new applications. However, existing
applications will continue to run. Additionally it is possible
for application owners to request usage tokens in advance,
and deploy this token when he actually wants to deploy
the application. In this case, the Platform Owner does not
need to be available at the moment of deployment. Addi-
tionally in many networks, there will be nodes of many dif-
ferent Platform Owners available, so only a limited part of
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deployments.
When an Application Owner becomes unavailable, then
the applications owned by that application owner will not
be able to send their data back to the owner, nor will the
server monitor the existing applications. The autonomous
behaviour of the nodes will however continue to operate.7.3.8. Summary
This evaluation shows the SecLooCI architecture meets
the proposed requirements. SecLooCI offers a comprehen-
sive sensor node security middleware enable shared usage
of sensor networks and is able to run on low power sensor
nodes.7.4. Security analysis
This section performs a security analysis by looking at
the security guaranteed by the middleware while facing
the three types of attackers as identified in Section 3.2:
the network attacker (NA), the physical attacker (PA), and
the insider attacker (IA). This section applies the STRIDE
threat model [67] and assigns each threat to their main
actor(s): Spoofing identity (NA + PA), Tampering with data
(NA + PA), repudiation (IA), Information disclosure
(NA + PA + IA), Denial of service (NA), and Elevation of priv-
ilege (IA). We chose STRIDE because it is an industry stan-
dard, proposed by Microsoft, and recommended by OWASP
[68], the Open Web Access Security Project with members
such as HP, IBM, and Oracle. OWASP recommends STRIDE
because it works well for addressing the unique challenges
facing web application security and is simple to learn and
adopt by designers, developers, code reviewers, and the
quality assurance team. Next this section reviews for each
of the attackers the potential attacks they can perform as
identified by STRIDE.
A network attacker is an attacker who is not part of the
network. He can potentially (1) Spoof identity for manag-
ing nodes, (2) Tamper with application or management
data, (3) Disclose information, and (4) Perform denial of
service attacks. The system prevents the first three attacks,
and offers potential mitigation against the forth attack.
First, the secure application management framework pre-
vents identity spoofing, by requiring all management
actions to be encrypted and authenticated. Since we
assume that attackers cannot break encryption algorithms,
we must conclude that an NA cannot perform identity
spoofing. Second, the network communication framework
ensures that no information is disclosed and prevents tam-
pering. All network communication is encrypted with
integrity protection. This ensures that a network attacker
cannot read message contents, only see that messages
are passed, nor tamper with messages without being
detected. Finally, the network attacker can perform denial
of service (DoS) attacks. The current prototype offers no
specific protection against such attacks. The proposed mid-
dleware does have tools that can detect DoS attacks. The
monitoring and enforcement framework can monitor for
DoS attacks by monitoring failed authorisation or excessive
network activity, and when detected can try to notify theAO, and potentially temporarily disable the network stack
to save energy.
A physical attacker on the other hand, can physically
probe a node and retrieve all key material that is present
on that node. When this happens, all keys used for network
and application security will be available to the physical
attacker. He can then perform the following attacks: (1)
Spoofing identity, (2) tampering with data, and (3) disclose
information. Spoofing identity is prevented by requiring all
nodes to have separate key material for management oper-
ations. Since a physical attacker only gets the management
keys from the nodes he broke, he does not have access to
the other node keys, and cannot spoof identity.
A physical attacker can tamper with data and disclose
information of all messages that are encrypted with keys
known to the broken nodes. For application communica-
tion, only the end points know the used encryption keys.
So if the physical attacker breaks a node that is not part
of the confidential communication group, he cannot read
the encrypted messages. While the current system does
not currently have any detection for physical attackers,
the framework has several ways to recover network secu-
rity when it has been detected that a node is compromised.
The system can recover from a node capture by performing
a re-keying operation. Once a node breach is detected, the
node owners can re-key all confidentiality keys, and leave
the breached node out of the re-keying process. Since each
node has unique management keys, the breached node
cannot read the re-keying messages sent to other nodes,
and prevents the physical attacker from continuing to read
or tamper with the messages.
Finally, an insider attacker has key material to manage
nodes, and is permitted to do certain management opera-
tions. This allows him to the following attacks: (1) Repudi-
ation and (2) elevation of privilege. The secure application
management framework ensures non-repudiation since
the insider cannot deny performing an operation. Since
keys are unique per user and only known to the user, the
node and the node owner, the user cannot deny perform-
ing an operation on the node to the node owner. Secondly
the secure application management framework prevents
elevation of privilege, since privilege elevation operations
are only permitted to the node owner.
To summarise, the security framework prevents many
possible attacks from network, physical and internal
attackers. Most of the possible attacks of network and insi-
der attacks are prevented, and, while the framework can-
not prevent physical attacks, it offers the tools to recover
from such attacks.
7.5. General discussion
The previous section has shown that the SecLooCI archi-
tecture and implementation achieve the design goals. The
architecture discussion verifies that the architecture meets
the non-functional requirements. The security analysis
shows that the middleware offers a wide range of counter-
measures against many types of attacks. The prototype
implementation overview confirms that the security mid-
dleware architecture can be implemented on resource con-
strained hardware. The integrated scenario demonstrates
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agement, most cost is still incurred by security metadata
and cryptographic processes during application runtime,
which are necessary even in a single party environment
to ensure the secure operation of the WSN. This allows
us to conclude that it is feasible to install a comprehensive
security middleware on current resource constrained
nodes, which allows multi-user node interactions. This
enables the roll out of secure shared sensor networks, with
dynamic trust setup, limiting of node usage, and charge-
back of said node usage.
Next this section discusses the trust requirements for
the security middleware, the energy consumption of the
security middleware, and some limitations of the current
prototype.
Trust requirements This system requires the different
parties to trust each other, in order for the different data
flows to succeed. By default, we assume that NOs and
POs will only offer their network and node services to par-
ties which they trust and only use trusted services. How-
ever, the architecture allows a trust by default approach,
where unknown parties are trusted, so this trust does not
need to be pre-established. There are also different levels
of trust. A PO can trust an NO to use its networking service,
but not trust the NO sufficiently to allow the NO to use its
node services. Additionally a PO could trust some AOs to
that extend to allow all sensors and actuators on its nodes,
while the PO has lower trust in other AOs, only allowing
them to use a limited amount of sensors, likely with stron-
ger policies enforced on the node.
In secure environments, we do assume that there has to
be an increased level of trust between the NOs, POs, and
AOs. This does not mean that every PO needs to manually
sign an agreement with every AO and PO. We foresee a sys-
tem of trusted third parties (a certificate authority), with
which the parties register. The different owners trust these
authorities and all parties certified by them, providing cer-
tain services to all parties certified. Potentially there can
even be multiple levels of certification, allowing multiple
levels of trust. This system has proved to be quite scalable,
and provides a fairly good level of security.
Energy consumption We estimate that the additional
energy consumption of the prototype is relatively low
compared to a non-secure system. De Meulenaer et al.
[69] have shown that the cost of encryption, which is the
main processing overhead of the security middleware, is
relatively small compared to communication overhead
when using symmetric encryption algorithms (less then
5%), and that the main cost of communication is fromwait-
ing and synchronisation. The actual cost of transmission
and reception is only ca 10% of the total communication
overhead.
The security middleware sends a limited amount of
additional messages during the setup phase to set up key
material and security policies. The test scenario sends
2459 bytes of functional data, compared to 964 bytes of
security (and crypto) data, which is only 28%. However,
this is a one-time cost when setting up the application.
The setup data is only ca 5% of communication relative to
a single day of normal operation.After the set-up phase, the security middleware mainly
encrypts messages or appends some security meta-infor-
mation, causing some overhead. However, most of this
overhead are message authentication codes and general
security metadata, which are also necessary in secure sin-
gle user environment. The additional overhead for multi-
user interactions is estimated on ca 10%. The monitoring
framework sends additional messages, however previous
research has shown that the overhead of a sufficiently
accurate view is generally low compared to the total
amount of traffic as generated by the application [27],
and can be parametrized to ensure minimal overhead. This
allows us to conclude that the network lifetime will not be
impacted significantly by the additional communication
and processing required for the security middleware.
Current limitations Designing and building the proto-
type has shown us some interesting limitations. The most
crucial implementation limit is the memory constraints.
All elements, from userId to permissions, party informa-
tion, component resource restrictions, consume some lim-
ited RAMmemory. The current implementation only offers
2500 bytes of free RAM. This causes the current implemen-
tation to only support about 20 concurrent users and par-
ties per node, with about a dozen components, each with a
few resource consumption policies. With regards to static
memory, only 36 kB of ROM remains, which translates to
space for the code of nine components. Note that this code
can be instantiated multiple times, so one can run the
same code with different properties (e.g. filters with differ-
ent high and low borders).
Due to these memory limitations, certain trade-offs
have been made. The most severe one is that the current
access control prototype limits the access control scheme
to a hierarchical role based scheme. This allows for more
efficient storage, but limits the access control policy
options. In the current system, managers cannot assign
per user and per service access control, but can assign
users to roles with a party, and permit access to services
of a party to certain roles.
Another limitation encountered while creating the pro-
totype on this resource constrained hardware is that asym-
metric cryptography is currently too resource consuming.
This prohibits the usage of certificates to communicate
with the sensor nodes. Certificates currently used in pro-
duction systems are still to heavy weight to be of much
usage, requiring too much time to verify and authenticate
users. To mitigate this, the prototype uses tokens and
industry grade symmetric key cryptography to maintain
a high level of security.
None of these limitations are however fundamental to
the architecture, but are trade-offs made to implement
the architecture on currently available resource con-
strained hardware. When more resource rich embedded
devices become ubiquitously available, the implementa-
tion of the architecture can be updated to make different
trade-offs in favour of more expressive policies and easier
user management, with no changes to the core architec-
ture. However this implementation teaches us what is
the minimal amount of resources required when building
a secure, dynamical, networked sensor node system.
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This paper proposes a comprehensive secure software
architecture for wireless sensor nodes. We have imple-
mented this architecture in a security middleware. These
results could definitely benefit from complementary
research: on sensor hardware and on management inter-
faces for WSN.
In order to further guarantee a secure and efficient
shared platform some hardware provisions are needed that
are not present in the current generation of sensor nodes.
First is the need for secure, concurrent, and isolated execu-
tion of the application components on the sensor node.
Future research should examine the possibility for creating
hardware secured and isolated execution environments for
sensor node applications, thus enabling the isolated execu-
tion of components of different users. Secondly, additional
research should investigate how to efficiently manage the
evolution of cryptographic algorithms on wireless sensor
nodes. While current algorithms are considered safe and
are implemented efficiently in hardware, long term
deployments might need to receive upgrades to installed
cryptographic algorithms during the lifetime of the WSN.
It is very important to study how this will affect the sensor
nodes.
The second avenue of future work is in the domain of
human–computer interaction. In order to operate andman-
age large scale multi-party sensor networks, there is a clear
need for a user interface that allows end-users to provide
their applications and to express the functional and the
security requirements at a high level. These high level dec-
larations could then be processed by a planning infrastruc-
ture on the server side, possibly involving the negotiation of
potential deployments between the Application Owners
and Platform Owners. It is unclear how the non-expert
end-users should interact with the whole ecosystem of
sensing and processing capabilities. In this context, the
security scope can be divided into two parts: (1) application
security specification and (2) management security specifi-
cation. Firstly, end users must be able to easily declare
application security specifications. Similar to the case of
personal computing devices, most end-users will not create
their own applications, but rather install and parameterise
existing applications to suit their own needs. However, this
parameterisation and especially the specification of secu-
rity requirements (confidentiality/integrity/authenticity of
data) remains challenging. Secondly, end-users should be
able to specify which parties have access to their systems;
they should be able to set up a secure shared environment
with minimal effort. Users need to be able to specify trust
relationships and node, network and party wide resource
policies in a simple yet expressive fashion. This requires
research in how end-users are able to express their trusted
parties and resource limitation requirements, which subse-
quently must be enforced in the WSN using the proposed
WSN security middleware.
8. Conclusion
WSNs in real world applications have to support multi-
ple users interacting with the sensor nodes in a dynamic,evolvable network that runs multiple applications simulta-
neously. However, current research in application develop-
ment, management and security does not provide an
adequate solution to allow wireless sensor networks to
be used in such dynamic multi-user and multi-application
ecosystems. This paper identifies five key data flows that
need new additional support from the node middleware
to ensure safe and secure multi-user node interactions:
(1) network initialisation, (2) application deployment, (3)
application management, (4) application service usage,
and (5) application communication. Mainly, the paper
presents SecLooCI, the comprehensive middleware that
supports multi-party usage of resource-constrained
infrastructures.
The paper presents the concepts, architecture, imple-
mentation and integration of the necessary middleware
components in order to secure these data flows, and shows
the interaction and dependencies between them. The
implementations are extensively evaluated with regards
to communication, memory and processing overhead.
These evaluations show that, while the overhead of sup-
porting multi-party interactions in WSNs is significant, it
is acceptable to roll out even on current generation
resource constrained devices. This shows the feasibility of
multiple parties directly and securely interacting with
shared, resource constrained, embedded sensor nodes.
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